Abstract-Botnet detection has attracted lots of attention since botnet attack is becoming one of the most serious threats on the Internet. But little work has considered the online detection. In this paper, we propose a novel approach that can monitor the botnet activities in an online way. We define the concept of "feature streams" to describe raw network traffic. If some feature streams show high similarities, the corresponding hosts will be regarded as suspected bots which will be added into the suspected bot hosts set. After activity analysis, bot hosts will be confirmed as soon as possible. We present a simple method by computing the average Euclidean distance for similarity measurement. To avoid huge calculation among feature streams, classical Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) technique is adopted. Then an incremental calculation of DFT coefficients is introduced to obtain the optimal execution time. The experimental evaluations show that our approach can detect both centralized and distributed botnet activities successfully with high efficiency and low false positive rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Botnets are becoming one of the most serious security threats on the Internet. They are utilized as "platform" for attacks such as distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks and fraudulent activities [11] . Because of its severe threat and the potential losses that it can cause, even some governments are taking the threat of botnets seriously [21] . It is obvious that the battle against botnets has begun.
The detection and response for botnets are currently a particular challenge. It's very difficult to detect the botnets for the following reasons. First, botnets make use of middleware techniques which attack victims indirectly. Secondly, botnets always utilize some hidden strategies such as using random port instead of regular port or encrypting network traffic. Finally, botnets adopt some regular protocols such as IRC, HTTP, etc. It's very hard to distinguish botnet behaviors from normal network traffic with these common protocols.
Some approaches [4, 6, 12, 18] have been proposed to detect the presence of botnets. To the best of our knowledge, none of them has considered the online botnet detection method. They all focus on how to get the high accuracy with low false positive rate and false negative rate. Although the exact detection results could be obtained, it only reflects the past situation. The detection results may become useless after the network environment changed. In lots of applications, it is very necessary to monitor the current botnet activities especially during certain sensitive periods. For instance, hackers might release a message that some botnet-based attacks would break out at some day. In such cases, network managers need to focus on the current network environment on that day. They may want to know whether the malicious attacking activities have happened in the recent a few hours and update the newest attacking information continuously. In this situation, all those offline techniques may become invalid since they don't have online detection strategies. We need to develop a next-generation botnet detection technique which can monitor botnet behaviors in an online fashion and report the latest bot activities to users as soon as possible.
In this paper, we propose a novel method to monitor the botnet activities efficiently from huge network traffic. First, we capture the network traffic and filter off some irrelevant flows to reduce the traffic volume. Then some characteristics of each flow are extracted to construct the feature stream. After that, we adopt incremental Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) to search the similarities from these feature streams. And suspected bot hosts will be recognized if the corresponding feature streams have high similarities, which will be added into the suspected bot hosts set with their final identities being confirmed by further activity analysis. This paper has the following main contributions:  We develop a novel botnet detection framework which can detect botnet activities in an online way;  We propose the definition of feature stream to represent complex network traffic flows;  We introduce the incremental DFT technique to analyze the similarities among huge feature streams. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we describe the background and motivation. In section III, we introduce the architecture and method of our online botnet detection in detail. In section IV, we describe the experimental evaluations on real world network traces. We review the related work in section V and conclude in section VI.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION

A. Concept of botnet
To propose our approach mentioned above, we begin with analyzing the definition and the intrinsic properties of botnet. Botnet are fundamentally grouped by a "botherder" which is the commander of the botnet, some "bots" or "zombies" that cause them to operate against the owners' intentions without being discovered, and a command and control channel by which botherder communicates with the bots (or bots communicate with each other). Fig. 1 shows a typical botnet structure. Here we defined a botnet as: "Lots of hosts (bots or zombies) infected with pre-programmed malicious malware code are coordinated through a command and control(C&C) channel by commander (botherder) for brute-force and subtle attacks." Also, we can represent a botnet B with five tuples: B={Z, H, V, M, C}, where Z={Z i } i=1,2,…,n , each Z i is a zombie or a bot, S represents the botherder, V means the victim, M denotes the malicious malware codes which is usually pre-programmed by the botherder. The bots are infected by email, instant message, remote software vulnerability, web page and "seed" botnets etc. [7] . C means the C&C channel. The structure of the C&C channel has fallen into two categories: centralized structures and distributed structures. Centralized C&C channel is commonly based on IRC or HTTP protocol. Distributed C&C channel is mostly based on P2P protocol. Obviously, these bots are used to perform malicious activities on the victims indirectly. On the other hand, the bots receive commands from botherder through We notice that the information collected from the historical network traffic might become outdated and useless since the current network environment always keeps changing and updating. For instance, when we analyze the past traffic logs to detect IRC-based botnets, the whole structure and the controller (server) may be varied into a new one. Besides, network managers always need to track the abnormal activities as soon as possible, such as searching for the botnet attacking in the recent one hour. All those offline detection methods would become invalid because they just access the historical traffic. When the complex analysis is accomplished, the attacks may have stopped for a long time and the bots may have already disappeared.
The aim of our approach is to detect botnet activities in an online fashion. All the malicious activities would be reported as soon as possible when they are detected, by which we can collect enough information for investigation and defense. We not only focus on whether a group of compromised machines are part of a botnet, but also track all their activities at every moment.
Our detection approach has the following goals:  It is independent of the C&C communication content, which means that we don't need the prior knowledge of the C&C communication especially in some cases the C&C is encrypted. 

It is independent of botnet C&C protocol and structure. It can detect both centralized and distributed botnets.  It can perform online botnet detection with efficient execution time and low false positive rate.
III. ONLINE BOTNET DETECTION
A. Architecture
The architecture of our online botnet detection approach is shown in Fig. 3 . First, the raw network traffic is filtered to reduce the data volume. Then the feature streams are constructed from the traffic for further similarity search. After that, thousands of feature streams are monitored to measure the similarities by incremental Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) technique. The hosts whose feature streams have high similarities will be added into the suspected bot hosts set for further activity analysis. The result will be reported after the final confirmation.
B. Filter
When traffic flows arrive to our system continuously, we need to filter off irrelevant traffic and retain botnet traffic as much as possible. Since botnet traffic is only a small part of the huge network traffic, it is very hard to search for such small botnet traffic in large scale network environment. It is necessary to reduce the data volume. Meanwhile, reduction of the huge data volume can save the computation cost and improve the efficiency in next steps.
We perform the filter operation from the following areas. First, we filter the traffic flows by IP protocol to select TCP based flows. Second, it is filtered according to the whitelist and the blacklist from some well-known sites such as Yahoo, Google etc. Third, we select some small packets to go through (In [21] , using a 300-byte packet size cutoff). Finally, because we will analyze flows using C&C-like protocols (IRC, HTTP or P2P) [13] , some flows using other protocols, such as ICMP and UDP, are filtered off. 
C. Construction of feature stream
Our botnet detection approach is based on the analysis of network traffic flows. We define a flow as a series of packets that belong to the connection between two hosts during a certain period. Packets in one flow share the same source IP address, destination IP address and source port. For example, one host builds a TCP connection to another host through a certain source port for one hour. During this period, all the packets they communicate compose a flow.
Certainly, we can describe the flow using a full packets trace, but it will cost too much space. And it's unrealistic to compare the flows directly. It would be sufficient to extract some characteristics of a flow as the description, which will be much more compact. Flow characteristics can be easily expressed as time series. As time goes by, we just need to use these streaming time series to compare the similarities of raw flows. Meanwhile, since traffic content is often encrypted, it would be more powerful to compare the similarities based on some characteristics rather than packet content. The typical traffic flow characteristics are shown in TABLE I.
We present the definition of feature stream based on characteristics cited above to describe the flow for further comparison.
Definition 1 (Feature stream) A feature stream FS can be represented as 
The feature stream is infinite since traffic flows arrive continuously. It is impossible to process infinite feature streams, except only to deal with the recent data in the streams. Therefore, we adopt the sliding window model to retain the recent data. Fig. 4 . For example, if we want to track the feature streams in the recent two hours and update the current data every 10 minutes, then the sliding window size and the hop window size are 120 and 10 minutes respectively. The size of sliding window and hop window could be given by users according to different applications.
In this way, we transform raw traffic flows into regular feature streams and adopt sliding window model to retain the recent data. Next, we will propose our similarity search approach based on DFT technique.
D. Similarity search
In this section, we firstly present the simple method by computing the average Euclidean distance for similarity search. To avoid huge calculation among huge feature streams, we adopt classical DFT technique. And then we introduce an incremental calculation of DFT coefficients to get the optimal execution time.
1) Simple calculation:
Because the values of different characteristics for the feature stream may have magnitude that must be normalized, otherwise characteristic with large values will outweigh the characteristic with smaller values.
We introduce the normalization as follows: Let where x and σ x denote the mean value and standard deviation of X respectively.
We will normalize each dimension of the feature stream and compute the average Euclidean distance of each dimension as the final distance of feature streams. 
If D i, j < ε, we consider the two feature streams have high similarities and their original traffic will be regarded as suspected botnet traffic. The corresponding hosts will be put into suspected bot hosts set for further analysis.
In practice, each feature stream just keeps the recent data by adding a sliding window. When new data arrives, the window gradually slides to accommodate the newest value. We want to monitor the whole process in order to detect all the bot activities.
We face the challenge of computing the similarities among huge feature streams which will be updated continuously as time goes by. The pair-wise comparison will be very costly and unsuitable for online monitoring. Moreover, it would be impractical to recalculate all the results when new values arrive. Next, we will introduce the DFT method for efficient similarity search without complex calculation.
2) Discrete Fourier Transform: We adopt Discrete Fourier Transformation (DFT) [2] to extract the main feature of each feature stream. 
where w represents the sequence length. The DFT is one of the most widely used feature extraction method. It can preserve the Euclidean distance between two sequences, i.e., for two sequences X and Y,
distance(X, Y)=distance(DFT(X), DFT(Y)).
For time series, the first few DFT coefficients contain most of the energy [2] , we just need to focus on these coefficients to capture the main feature of the raw sequence. The similarity information can be obtained by calculating the distance among the fewer DFT coefficients.
For feature streams, all the values from the identical dimension can be regarded as a time sequence. By DFT, we can get the final distance between feature streams by computing the average value of Euclidean distance for each dimension efficiently. In this way, we can reduce the data size greatly and speed up the similarity search.
However, each time a new value in the feature stream arrives, the DFT coefficients must be recalculated by using the recent w values. It's still costly since the computation of DFT is expensive. Next, we introduce a novel incremental method [16] to cut down the calculation cost further.
3) Incremental DFT calculation: We introduce a method to illustrate that the DFT coefficients could be updated incrementally by (3) . We needn't to recalculate all the coefficients when the new value arrives. 
Next, we will explain the above formula in detail. It is noted that X(i)=Y(i) (1≤ i ≤ w-1) . The n th DFT coefficient of X is given by: 
By taking into consideration that X(i)=Y(i) (1≤ i ≤ w-1)
It equals to (3).
When a new value arrives in the feature stream, the DFT coefficient can be obtained incrementally by the old DFT coefficient. In this way, we needn't to recalculate the DFT coefficient every time when the window slides. Consequently, the efficiency of similarity search is greatly enhanced.
E. Activity Analysis
After the online similarity search, we select those flow pairs that have high similarities to build a relation table. And the corresponding hosts are regard as suspected bot hosts which compose a suspected bot hosts set. The huge network traces are compressed into a very compact data set which reflects recent suspected bot activities. We only need to analyze the activities of each suspected bot host to confirm the final result.
There are lots of powerful intrusion detection tools which can analyze malicious activities in real time [3, 8, 19] . But these tools are not sufficient to confirm the botnet activities. First, lots of malicious activities are not performed by botnet, rather by other computer viruses. Second, the current network scale could be very huge. It would be very costly to monitor these hosts to search for the bot activities because the botnet traffic is only a small part compared with the network traffic background.
For these reasons, we implement our own bot activity monitor based on Snort [3] . We generate our own filtering condition for IP addresses in the intrusion detection module. According to the hosts in the suspected bot hosts set, we set a much smaller scanning range for IP addresses. In this way, we just need to focus on much fewer hosts to improve the efficiency.
We adopt the existing technique [11, 12, 24] as the Snort pro-processor plug-ins to match the bot activities. It can detect most of the bot activities such as scanning, binary downloading, spamming, etc. If the host in the suspected bot hosts set has at least one malicious activity, it will be reported as bot host as soon as possible. Those bot hosts whose identities have been confirmed will be treated as "key" hosts. Network managers would focus on these hosts for further intrusion defense. Considering that the bot master may command the bots to perform a delayed task, i.e., bots may start the malicious activities some time later after receiving the command, a deadline will be generated for those hosts whose identities haven't been identified. And they will be removed from the suspected bot hosts set if they don't perform any malicious activities until the deadline.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
To evaluate the performance of our online detection technique, we tested it on real world network traces. We performed a series of experiments to evaluate this method.
A. Dataset
In our experiment, we chose two characteristics to construct the feature streams: average Bytes-per-packets (BPP) and packet amount. They both have great efficiency in describing the raw traffic flows. Each value in the feature stream is obtained for every minute.
In order to construct the datasets, we captured the network traffic in our laboratory. The traffic is about 150M~250M at daytime, which contains almost all kinds of application protocols, such as HTTP, SMTP, P2P, etc. This normal network traffic is a good background to test the precision and detection performance.
To obtain the centralized botnet trace, we constructed a botnet test environment in our laboratory. Our setup contains one IRC server, 10 bot hosts, one attacker and one victim. We modified the source codes of three common bots, i.e., Sdbot, Agobot, Rbot and recreated our own versions so that these bots only connected to our controlled IRC server. Considering the security, we ran this constrained botnet in a local network. We recorded all the data traffic using these three different botnets respectively. During several hours, the IRC server communicated with these bot hosts and instructed them to perform malicious activities such as scanning. The bot traces generated 18 bot feature streams which last about 200 minutes. All of these traces in this botnet were captured to build the dataset. We constructed 3 IRCbased dataset, i.e., IRC-sdbot, IRC-agobot and IRC-rbot. Each of them includes more than 1000 feature streams which last 1000 minutes. We also obtained a distributed botnet trace based on Nugache (a famous P2P-based botnet [17] ) from the University of Texas at Dallas. The trace contained 4 Nugache bots. It was captured from a virtual network where the bot binary was run for 40 hours in late 2007. We constructed 12 bot feature streams which last about 100 minutes. We merged them into the normal network traffic and constructed a P2P-based datasets: P2P-nugache. It included more than 200 feature streams which last 300 minutes.
B. Precision
Although the bot activities change frequently in our botnet, we try to detect all the behaviors when bots perform attacking. We monitored the feature streams to detect all the activities using our online method. Then we compared the detection result with the behaviors we have recorded in advance. The sliding window size is set to 20 minutes and the distance threshold is set to 1.6.
TABLE II shows that our method can detect all the botnet activities of these three botnets successfully. There are no false negatives. We select a small period during which 5 bots have malicious behaviors in IRC-rbot. As shown in Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(b) , the trend curves are generated by choosing the packet amount and Bytes-perpackets (BPP) from the corresponding feature streams. Fig. 5(c) is the distance curve among the five feature streams. The whole period lasts 100 minutes. We update the sliding window every 2 minutes and record the distances among feature streams of bots within the sliding windows. There are 40 points in all as shown in Fig. 5(c) .
We can see that all the distances are below the distance threshold. The bot activities can be detected successfully by similarity analysis. However, there are also false positives for all the three botnets. The false positive rates are all below 20% as TABLE II shows. The reason is that some normal host activities may also be treated as bot activities, i.e., several hosts may log on the IRC server to chat with each other without any malicious behaviors. But the false positive rate is still relative low because we will analyze their activities to confirm the final result.
As we can see, this online detection method performs well in precision evaluation, showing an excellent detection precision with relative low false positive rate in real world network traces.
C. Execution time
We also performed a series of experiments to compare the execution time of the Incremental DFT method with the other two methods. The first one is the simple calculation method which will compute the distance in pair-wise way on the raw feature streams. The second one is traditional DFT method without updating coefficients incrementally.
First, we evaluated the processing time with different number of feature streams. We selected 1000 feature streams in IRC-rbot and 200 feature streams in P2P-nugache. The sliding window and the hop window size were set to 20 minutes and 5 minutes respectively. The execution time is recorded with the stream number increasing by three methods: simple comparison, normal DFT and our incremental DFT. The results of execution time are shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 . We can see that the time increase dramatically in an exponent way by simple calculation. Normal DFT method spent less execution time than simple calculation. Incremental DFT method has the least time compared to the other two methods, meanwhile the change trend rises much more smoothly as the stream amount increases.
We also showed the impact on the execution time with different sliding window size. We selected 500 feature streams in IRC-rbot and 100 feature streams in P2P-nugache. The sliding window size is set from 10 to 60 minutes. The hop window size is set to half of the sliding window size
The execution time of different sliding window size for these three methods is shown in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 . The execution time of all these three methods decreases gradually as the sliding window size increases from 10 to 60. The reason is that larger sliding window size causes fewer time-consuming updating. For each window size, incremental DFT method costs the least time compared with the other two methods. Obviously, our online detection method has much more efficiency for fast similarity search V. RELATED WORK Lots of work on botnets has been done. Early research focused on gaining a basic understanding of the intrinsic properties of botnets. Cooke et al. outlined the origins and structure of three general command and control topologies based botnets [6] . Collins et al. studied the relationship between scanning and botnet population, and used uncleanliness to predict future botnet addresses [5] . To collect and analyze the bots, honeypot techniques have been used. Freiling et al. studied the problem of botnets by means of honeypots [9] .
Recently, researchers have proposed many new botnet detection schemes. Some of them are host-based methods. Al-Hammadi and Aickelin investigated a behavioral algorithm to detect a single bot that used keylogging activity [1] . There are also some efforts on network-based detection. Rishi is an IRC botnet detection system, which uses n-gram analysis to detect bot-infected machines [10] . In [15] , Karasardis presented an algorithm for the botnet detection using passive analysis based on flow data. Other studies have proposed some techniques to monitor DNS traffic for botnet detection. Dagon et al. studied the dynamics of botnet through DNS tracking techniques [8] . Choi proposed a botnet detection mechanism by monitoring DNS traffic [4] .
Early botnet detection techniques in similarity measurement are based on traffic contents (see [20] and [23] ). Since network traffic is often encrypted, these techniques are not applicable. An alternative is to exploit some characteristics, such as packet characteristics, i.e., timing, size and duration etc., and traffic flow characteristics, i.e., flow start/end times and total bytes exchanged in flow etc. Zhang and Paxon [25] detected stepping-stone connections by comparing the ending of "off periods" in two data flows. In [14] , two activitybased algorithms are proposed to detect stepping-stone connections with bounded memory or bounded delay perturbation, respectively. In order to increase robustness of correlation, W. Timothy Strayer [22] proposed a new flow correlation algorithm based on multiple flow characteristics. Besides, in [13] , they mentioned three methods to measure the similarity between two messages from botnet, i.e., edit distance, longest common subsequence and DICE coefficient. However, they all adopt the offline processing approaches, which pursue high precision with relatively low false positive and false negative rate, but the efficiency will be affected greatly. None of them takes the online processing into account. Our technique can detect botnet in an online way, which is the main difference from the existing works.
VI. CONCLUSION
Botnet detection is playing an important role with the rapid development of hack techniques. The bots belonging to the same botnet share identical commands and have similar malicious activities. In this paper, we introduce an online bonet detection technique based on similarity search among huge amount of network traffic. We adopt compact feature streams to represent raw traffic flows. And the incremental DFT technique is used to speed up the similarity search for botnet detection. We performed a series of experiments to evaluate the precision and execution time of this method. The experimental result shows that it is very efficient with low false positive rate.
Based on this study, we suggest that further studies should consider the scalability of activity analysis by new techniques. We will make use of the current detection method such as online clustering technique to track the botnet activities as soon as possible.
